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Peter Wildeford @peterwildeford

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Nathan 🔍 reposted
Peter Wildeford... @peterwildef... · 9h
AI timelines -

I've been souring lately on the idea of predicting an arrival date for 'superintelligence' and 'recursive self-improvement' milestones, because this implies that everything prior to this date will be relatively chill and normal, and I don't think that's the case.

But if you define 'runaway recursive self-improvement is possible' as a situation in which AIs can replace highly skilled expert human labor in all aspects of the AI research and development process ('superhuman AI researcher' in the AI2040 framework or 'AI research supremacy' in Cotra's framework). I think it is 50-50 we will reach this milestone in 4 years or earlier.

My 80% confidence interval for this date of runaway RSI is 1-30 years, as there is a long tail where capability progress plateaus.

This also means there is a ~10% chance that we are faced with the possibility of runaway RSI in less than a year's time, similar to what AI2027 predicts.
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet by Peter Wildeford (reposted by an account named 'Nathan') giving his probabilistic forecast for when AI could achieve 'runaway recursive self-improvement,' defined as replacing expert human AI researchers, with a median of 4 years and an 80% CI of 1-30 years.

ai timelinesforecastingrecursive self-improvementtwitterai safety

@KhanSaifM

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Saif M. Khan @KhanSaifM · 4h
My extrapolation from data in Anthropic's August 2026 risk report suggests fully automated AI R&D sometime between Dec. 2026 to Feb. 2027 (or with pessimistic assumptions, more like 2028).

In the risk report, Anthropic provides data on Anthropic ECI (AECI) score growth per year as well as AECI and CoBench scores for several recent Claude models. (CoBench is an Anthropic-internal automated AI R&D benchmark.) It also asserts "that a model which was truly capable of fully substituting for Anthropic research staff would be able to score at least 85% on [CoBench.]"

Using these datapoints, see two Claude-generated charts: 1) CoBench vs. AECI scores, which suggests that a 168 AECI score gets you full AI R&D automation (or 182 AECI with a more pessimistic fit); and 2) projecting when Claude models achieve AECI scores of 168 and 182.

This is a quite naive extrapolation and I have no idea if Anthropic would endorse the result!

[Embedded chart image]
ANTHROPIC RISK REPORT · AUGUST 2026
When could AI fully automate AI R&D?
Anthropic now publishes an internal capability index (AECI) and a bar for full researcher substitution (CoBench ≥ 85%). Chaining the two: the bar sits at AECI ≈ 168 — on trend, an internal frontier model gets there around Dec 2026 - Feb 2027 (Sep 2026 if progress is accelerating; 2028 on the pessimistic mapping). Anthropic's own words: plausibly "a major concern in the next 6-12 months."
Chart 1: "Anthropic ECI over time — extrapolated to the full-substitution band"
Legend: Anthropic frontier, Off-frontier, Mythos-class, Model 2 (unreleased), Projection fan 7.5-28.8/yr, Substitution band
Y-axis: Anthropic ECI, 120-180+. X-axis: 2024-2028 (by quarter/year labels: Jul, 2025, Jul, 2026, Jul, 2027, Jul, 2028)
Annotations: "CoBench 85% → AECI ≈ 168.4"; "Sep 2026 - if accelerating"; "trend continuation - 13.5/yr"; points labeled Claude 3 Opus (~2024, ECI ~125), pre-Mythos frontier 13.5 AECI/yr (report's fit), Opus 4.6 (~2026, ECI ~150), Mythos Preview, Mythos 5, Model 2 (~Dec 2026), Apr 2027 - slow
Below, second chart begins: "CoBench score vs AECI — where the fit crosses the 85% bar" Legend: Opus-class, Mythos-class, Logistic fit (5 models), Mythos-only fit, 85% = "could fully substitute for research staff" [chart cut off at 100%]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet by Saif M. Khan extrapolating from Anthropic's August 2026 risk report to estimate a timeline for fully automated AI R&D (Dec 2026-Feb 2027 optimistic, 2028 pessimistic), with two embedded Claude-generated charts plotting Anthropic ECI scores over time and CoBench score vs AECI.

ai riskanthropicai r&d automationforecastingtwitterclaude models

Leo Gao @nabla_theta

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Leo Gao @nabla_theta
[Attached meme image, described below]
1:12 AM · Aug 10, 2026 · 33K Views
15 replies, 106 reposts, 2K likes, 215 bookmarks
Relevant / View quotes

Harold @HaroldsAltAct · 1h
OP will get <100 views on the thread and no comments because his arguments are so rock-solid that there's nothing left to critique.

Nobody will even know the post existed until after the events unfold and a vagueposter reposts the thread on xitter.
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Cartoon meme titled 'THE CONCRETEPOST KING' — a bearded king in blue robes holding a scepter topped with a cement mixer drum, standing next to a framed picture of a concrete-mixer truck and a computer monitor displaying a LessWrong post that reads 'Here's exactly what I believe will happen. Happy to operationalize and bet on any disagreements.' A reply from Harold jokes that such rock-solid, well-operationalized posts get ignored until events prove them right and get reposted elsewhere.

lesswrongtwittermemeforecastingrationalist humor

Dean W. Ball @deanwball

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Dean W. Ball @deanwball · 28m
if you can master the meta-skill of figuring out what problems in arbitrary domains are computationally tractable, you will have the opportunity, for at least a year two, and maybe longer, to be a kind of meta-genius. you will not know the answer to anything, or even how to find it, but you'll have refined heuristics for the right questions to ask about everything to make meaningful progress along the margin. this is probably the skill to have optimized for in the last three years, though I readily admit I don't know how long it will remain a human advantage. it is for now though.
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet from Dean W. Ball on the meta-skill of figuring out which problems in arbitrary domains are computationally tractable as a source of near-term human advantage in an AI-saturated environment.

aiskillsforecasting

Jerry Tworek @MillionInt

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Jerry Tworek @MillionInt · 6h
First time we figured out any reasoning method with neural networks:
- AI progress moves decades forward
- new trillion dollar companies started popping out almost overnight
- all exams and competitions got solved by AI
- any notion of cyber safety gets shattered

Discovering new, different, more efficient method of reasoning does not seem impossible...
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet from Jerry Tworek (@MillionInt) speculating that discovering a new, more efficient reasoning method for neural networks is plausible, given the disruptive effects of the first such discovery (reasoning models).

ai progressreasoning modelsforecasting

Dwarkesh Patel @dwarkesh_sp

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Dwarkesh Patel @dwarkesh_sp . 13h
Full debate from 2021:

lesswrong.com/s/n945eovrA3oD...

[Christiano][22:57]
right now I think hardware R&D is on the order of $100B/year, AI R&D is more like $10B/year, I guess I'm betting on something more like trillions? (limited from going higher because of accounting problems and not that much smart money)

I don't think steel production is going up at that point

plausibly going down since you are redirecting manufacturing capacity into making more computers. But probably just staying static while all of the new capacity is going into computers, since cannibalizing existing infrastructure is much more expensive

the original point was: you aren't pulling AlphaZero shit any more, you are competing with an industry that has invested trillions in cumulative R&D

[Yudkowsky][23:00]
is this in hopes of future profit, or because current profits are already in the trillions?

[Christiano][23:01]
largely in hopes of future profit / reinvested AI outputs (that have high market cap), but also revenues are probably in the trillions?

[Yudkowsky][23:02]
this all sure does sound "pretty darn prohibited" on my model, but I'd hope there'd be something earlier than that we could bet on. what does your Prophecy prohibit happening before that sub-prophesied day?

[2 replies, 2 reposts, 71 likes, 11K views]

Dwarkesh Patel @dwarkesh_sp . 13h
In 2016 (before transformers) Paul wrote,

"It's plausible that a large neural network can replicate "fast" human cognition, and that by coupling it to simple computational mechanisms—short and long-term memory, attention, etc.—we could obtain a human-level computational architecture. It's plausible that a variant of RL can train this architecture to actually implement human-level cognition."
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Continuation of the @dwarkesh_sp thread on Paul Christiano's predictions: a screenshot excerpt of the 2021 LessWrong Christiano/Yudkowsky takeoff-speed debate transcript, followed by the start of a new tweet quoting Christiano's 2016 (pre-transformer) writing on neural networks plausibly reaching human-level cognition.

ai safetytakeoff speedspaul christianoeliezer yudkowskyforecastinglesswrong

Dwarkesh Patel @dwarkesh_sp

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@dwarkesh_sp
.@paulfchristiano has such an crazy good prediction record.

These are some quotes from way back in 2021 during a debate he was having with Eliezer about takeoff speeds:

"So like, I think we are going to have crappy coding assistants, and then slightly less crappy coding assistants, and so on. And they will be improving the speed of coding very significantly before the end times.

"[Before ASI, we'll have] hundreds of billions of dollars of spending at google on automating AI R&D... massive scaleups in semiconductor manufacturing, bidding up prices of inputs crazily... massive speculative rises in AI company valuations financing a significant fraction of GWP into AI R&D (+hardware R&D, +building new clusters) .... largely in hopes of future profit / reinvested AI outputs (that have high market cap), but also revenues are probably in the trillions?"

Honestly, it's pretty scary that people like Paul, who predicted the shape of our currently world so far in advance, think superintelligences taking over and disempowering humanity is eminently plausible.

All this to say, you should consider working with him.

[below, partially visible card: "How to help" / "ARC is hiring an automation lead and a chief of staff:" - cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet by @dwarkesh_sp quoting Paul Christiano's 2021 takeoff-speed predictions from his debate with Eliezer Yudkowsky, arguing Christiano's track record makes his p(doom)-relevant views on ASI disempowerment worth taking seriously, and pointing to an ARC hiring link.

ai safetytakeoff speedspaul christianoeliezer yudkowskyarcforecasting

FleetingBits @fleetingbits

quoting @dwarkesh_sp / ARC article — saved image

FleetingBits @fleetingbits · 2h
the problem with a lot of these predictions is that they were pretty much the same as what you would expect with ai being a transformative technology until you get to loss of control or whatever

like all of paul christiano's predictions here are just consistent with ai being a thing and not being priced in; and i think people that were closer to gpt-3 / ml at the time were better placed to see this

the risk narrative is pretty much separate from the capabilities / economic effect (similar issue with ai 2027)

[quoted tweet]
Dwarkesh Patel @dwarkesh_sp · 13h
.@paulfchristiano has such an crazy good prediction record.

These are some quotes from way back in 2021 during a debate he was having with Eliezer abo...

[quoted article/webpage, white background, serif font]
How to help

ARC is hiring an automation lead and a chief of staff:

• Automation lead. LLMs can increasingly automate ARC's technical work. Right now that means researchers using extensive AI assistance, but we want to hire an engineer and project lead to build better tooling, systematize our AI use, secure model and compute access, and generally make sure we are automating ourselves as quickly as possible. Apply here.
• Chief of staff. We are hiring a chief of staff to work closely with me to manage everything other than research direction as we scale: running our hiring processes, managing our operations lead, building out the non-research parts of the organization, and handling a long tail of tasks that would otherwise fall to me (like communication, funding, and project management). Apply here. [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet from @fleetingbits critiquing Paul Christiano's prediction record as consistent with generic 'AI as transformative technology' framing rather than distinctively prescient about loss-of-control risk, quoting Dwarkesh Patel praising Christiano's 2021 debate quotes with Eliezer Yudkowsky, which links to an ARC (Alignment Research Center) 'How to help' hiring page for an automation lead and chief of staff role.

ai safetypaul christianoarctwitterforecasting

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forecaster 3                                    < 3 / 12 >

status
| I am resubmitting the forecast data after correcting the schema error, maintaining my estimate that [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Screenshot of a terminal-style UI panel labeled 'forecaster 3' (item 3 of 12 in some navigable list), showing a monospace 'status' field with an agent-like status message about resubmitting forecast data after a schema error; message is cut off mid-sentence.

forecastingai agentsterminal ui

bayes @bayeslord

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bayes @bayeslord · 9h
Imo no because the path of progress we're on is clearly generalizing but hasn't yet swept the physical world. The physical world is affected by plans*actuation. Actuation is likely going to look like the easy part and plans are clearly getting solved. Note that by plans I mean in the generic sense of achieving complex goals in complex environments

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yung macro 宏观年少传奇 @apralky · 9h
Is there an underrated aspect where LLMs becoming increasingly superhuman at obviously heavily g-loaded tasks, while the physical world stays broadly unchanged, should actually be updating us in favor of the "world transformati…
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet exchange debating AI timelines/takeoff: @apralky asks whether LLMs becoming superhuman at g-loaded cognitive tasks while the physical world stays unchanged should update people away from near-term 'world transformation,' and @bayeslord replies that progress is generalizing but hasn't swept the physical world yet because physical impact depends on plans times actuation, and actuation (not planning) is likely the remaining bottleneck.

ai takeoffai timelinesphysical world automationforecasting

@ChrSzegedy

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Andrew Curran reposted
Christian Szegedy @ChrSzegedy · 9h
IMO, the next steps are:

Within 1 year: strictly better than human AI in all problem-solving aspects of math.

Within 2 years: producing mathematics becomes so cheap, AI will produce mathematical theories for all kinds of applied domains on the fly at need.

Mathematics becomes the true infrastructure of all of engineering and applied sciences (including AI, biology, optimization, cybersecurity, etc) where approaching things theoretically was too expensive to be practical.

[quoted tweet]
FleetingBits @fleetingbits · 9h
some thoughts on ai and math

1) a new openai model has solved 10 important problems in mathematics; and, the cost of solving them would be ~$2,000 at current api …
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet by Christian Szegedy predicting AI will surpass humans at all math problem-solving within a year and make mathematics theory generation for applied domains extremely cheap within two years, quoting a thread noting a new OpenAI model solved 10 important math problems at roughly $2,000 in API cost.

ai and mathopenaiforecastingchristian szegedyai capabilities

@Bayesian0_0

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Bayesian @Bayesian0_0 · 2h
Fun fact: Across 44 benchmarks that have a "Human baseline", the human baseline BECI (a personal replication of the Epoch Capabilities Index) comes out at 166.7, which projections say will be beat by AI models around october 2026!
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Attached chart titled 'Human baseline on the BECI scale (pooled human rows scored against frozen benchmark parameters; human data never enters the fit)': a scatter plot of scattered light-blue 'Models' points and a dark blue stepped 'Model frontier' line rising from ~105 BECI in 2023-01 to ~165 by mid-2026, with a dotted 'Frontier trend' line, a red horizontal 'Human baseline (pooled)' band at 166.7, and a dashed red vertical line marking a projected trend crossing around 2026-10-16, x-axis release date 2023-01 to 2026-07, y-axis BECI 60-180ish.

ai capabilitiesbenchmarksbeciepoch capabilities indexforecastingtwitter

@rand_longevity

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Rand @rand_longevity · 1h
do you think we are in the singularity?
90 replies, 12 reposts, 140 likes, 5.6K views

Larry Panozzo @LarryPanozzo · 29m
Hm I was about to say Yes but... No, because many can confidently predict the main dynamics of what's going to happen next year

Next year is the singularity because beyond that year, even while living out the year, we won't be able to predict much of anything, like not even 10%, of what ASI will bring thereafter
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A tweet exchange: Rand asks whether we're in the singularity; Larry Panozzo replies that we aren't yet because near-term dynamics are still predictable, arguing 'next year' will be the singularity since beyond it even 10% of what ASI brings becomes unpredictable.

singularityasiforecastingtwitter

Peter Barnett @peterbarnett_

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David Krueger 🇺🇸✊ reposted
Peter Barnett @peterbarnett_ · Jul 31
4 months ago Anthropic had a model gain internet access and hack another company.
Chinese AIs are 6-9 months behind.
Chinese developers generally care way less about safety/guardrails than US developers.
In 2-5 months we will likely see rogue Chinese AIs hacking other companies. This might include US companies, causing an international incident.
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Peter Barnett tweet forecasting that, following the earlier Anthropic incident of a model gaining internet access and hacking another company, Chinese AI developers (estimated 6-9 months behind and less safety-focused) will likely produce rogue AI hacking incidents within 2-5 months, possibly triggering an international incident.

ai safetychinaanthropiccybersecurityforecastingtwitter

AI Notkilleveryoneism... @AISafetyMemes

AI Notkilleveryoneis... ✔️ @AISafet... · 7h "How worried should you be based on recent events? Well, the world's top forecasters now "recommend readers consider moving their funds from European financial institutions." Why? They're more insecure compared to large American institutions, which have access to the latest AI models to faster patch their vulnerabilities with. "Our sources tell us that Banco Santander, in particular, is riddled with security gaps." Sentinel is one of my favorite newsletters, btw. Written by top forecasters, they deeply analyze current events to make probabilistic assessments of the likelihood of various things spiraling into global catastrophe. It's my "early-warning newsletter". sentinel-team .org" [Embedded screenshot of "Sentinel" newsletter, partially highlighted in blue:] "A "combination" of OpenAI models was revealed to be behind the cybersecurity breach at Hugging Face, which we reported on last week. It appears that the model(s) broke out of the sandbox that OpenAI had built and broke into Hugging Face in an attempt to cheat on the test it was being given. Cheating behaviour and reward hacking more broadly have been observed before by frontier AI labs, METR, and the UK's AI Security Institute (which published a report on the subject this week), but many of our forecasters are still surprised by the scale and audacity of the Hugging Face incident. Still, we think it's extremely unlikely that there will be any legal consequences for OpenAI, giving just a 2.6% (1% to 9%) chance that the company or any of its directors, officers, or employees will be arrested, charged, penalized, or subjected to formal regulatory or criminal enforcement action before 2028. [highlighted:] Some forecasters recommend that readers consider taking the precautionary steps of moving their funds away from European financial institutions, which are going to be more insecure, and into large American institutions, which have access to the latest AI models to faster patch their vulnerabilities with. Our sources tell us that Banco Santander, in particular, is riddled with security gaps, which would make sense in light of its fast expansion. In somewhat related news, Democratic Congressman Ted Lieu joined with 7 Republican Congressman Nathaniel Moran to introduce a bill, the AI Kill Switch Act, into the US..." [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet promoting the "Sentinel" forecasting newsletter, with an embedded screenshot of the newsletter itself; a portion of the newsletter text is highlighted in blue (about moving funds from European to American banks) with an edit/pencil icon overlay suggesting active annotation.

ai-safetycybersecurityforecastingfinancegovernance

Nat McAleese @__nmca__

reposted by Rob Miles

Rob Miles reposted Nat McAleese ✔ @__nmca__ · Jul 20 wow all these LLM math contributions are incredible. Who predicted this in advance? What else do they believe? [Engagement icons visible at bottom edge, counts cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Short sarcastic tweet about the accuracy of past predictions regarding LLM mathematical capability; engagement counts are cut off at the bottom of the screenshot.

ai capabilitiesmathematicsforecastingtwitter

prinz @deredleritt3r

quoting @_simonsmith

prinz ✔ @deredleritt3r · 1h 2025: AI is a toy 2026: AI is a genie that lives in a bottle; if you know where to find the bottle and how to phrase your wish, then your wish shall be fulfilled 2027: The genie has escaped the bottle, and lives alongside you; it infers your wishes from context and fulfills them before you ask; the most important skill is real-time genie steering [Quoted tweet:] Simon Smith ✔ @_simonsmith · 2h Watching the livestream, this felt like the closest I've ever seen an AI come to being a capable humanlike digital assistant, Jarvis, Her, what have you. And the benchmarks OpenAI shared reinforce that feeling.... [Four embedded bar/line charts comparing "gpt-live-1", "gpt-live-1-mini", and "AVM": Chart 1 "Model Conversation Ratings" — Flow of conversation: gpt-live-1 4.96, gpt-live-1-mini 4.33, AVM 3.80 (out of 7); Pleasantness: gpt-live-1 5.19, gpt-live-1-mini 4.47, AVM 3.82 Chart 2 (unlabeled, accuracy %): AVM 45.3%, then bars rising to 74.9%, 76.5%, 81.7%, 84.2% Chart 3 (unlabeled, accuracy %): 0.7%, 31.6%, 35.1%, 60.6%, 75.2% Chart 4 (task success rate line chart): points labeled "gpt-live-1 (Instant)" ~38%, "gpt-live-1-mini" ~44%, "gpt-live-1 (Medium)" ~64%, "gpt-live-1 (High)" ~68%, "AVM" ~30%]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Twitter commentary on AI assistant capability trajectory, quote-tweeting a reaction to an OpenAI livestream/benchmark release for a "gpt-live-1" voice-assistant model, with four embedded performance charts.

ai assistantsopenaibenchmarksforecastingtwitter

bayes @bayeslord

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bayes ✓ @bayeslord · 1h

I think people are going to be blindsided by algorithmic progress. The entire world, markets, governments, militaries, companies, people, etc. are all trying to make sense of AI and its impact in terms of the recent past's production efficiencies and regularities, and how things appear to be going. Even several of the purportedly "RSI"pilled neolabs seem to think this will be business as usual but with Agent in a loop.

No. My guess is there are many algorithmic OOMs left to go in the production of intelligence, maybe (maybe) up to ten, with four to seven seeming more likely. Going beyond even ten is possible in principle, but it strains hard against what I suspect the universe will actually let us do. Implausible but not impossible. If this is true then things aren't actually going as they appear to be going and a big jump is coming. Anything along these lines happening would make things, far weirder than almost anyone seems to be pricing in.
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Screenshot of an X post by @bayeslord arguing that the world is extrapolating AI progress from recent production efficiencies and will be blindsided, because there may be four to seven (up to ten) algorithmic orders of magnitude left in the production of intelligence — implying a discontinuous jump nobody is pricing in.

ai timelinesalgorithmic progressrsiforecastingtakeoff speed

Dan Schwarz @dschwarz26

@dschwarz26 (Dan Schwarz) — 2h First Claude Fable forecasting evals are up. Fable is the best single-agent researcher as judged by predicting 1k near-term business, science, and technology outcomes, but not by a statistically significant amount. We unfortunately didn't run Fable-xhigh or Fable-max in time. (Each of those runs would have cost thousands of dollars, a single agent driven by those models can cost a few dollars.) Obviously we also can't use Fable in FutureSearch's best forecaster, the one you get in the app. But we are building around it, for when it becomes available. We'll update evals.futuresearch.ai as we dig through the agent traces. I'm curious to see if Fable's strategic reasoning failure modes match Opus, e.g. failing to judge political incentives as well as humans. [Embedded image: table titled "BTF-3 Leaderboard, Evaluated: June 2026", subtitle "All scores are on the Brier scale; LOWER IS BETTER, and the best score in each column is bolded." Columns: AGENT | POOLED SCORE (n=1,007) | BINARY (Brier, n=759) | NUMERIC (RPS, n=248) 1. FutureSearch SOTA* — 0.116 [0.106-0.127] | 0.114 [0.100-0.128] | 0.123 [0.110-0.137] 2. Claude Fable 5 (high) — 0.126 [0.114-0.137] | 0.124 [0.109-0.140] | 0.130 [0.117-0.144] 3. Claude Opus 4.8 (xhigh) — 0.127 [0.116-0.138] | 0.126 [0.112-0.141] | 0.130 [0.117-0.143] 4. GPT-5.5 (agent SDK)‡ — 0.127 [0.118-0.136] | 0.129 [0.118-0.140] | 0.122 [0.109-0.135] (bolded, best numeric) 5. Claude Opus 4.8 (high) — 0.134 [0.123-0.145] | 0.128 [0.114-0.143] | 0.152 [0.138-0.165] (table cut off at bottom, more rows likely below)]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet with an embedded benchmark leaderboard table comparing forecasting accuracy of Claude Fable, Claude Opus 4.8, and GPT-5.5 variants.

claude fableforecastingai benchmarksfuturesearchclaude opus

Miles Brundage @Miles_Brundage

Miles Brundage ✓ @Miles_Brundage · 15h It is also hard to talk about it without sounding crazy [Quoted] 0.005 Seconds (3/... ✓ @secon... · May 22 its hard to conceive of how good the models are going to be summer of 2027
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Simple quote-tweet, no additional images.

twitterai progressai capabilitiesforecasting

@LRudL_

Rudolf Laine ✔ @LRudL_ · 21h The increasingly-hyperbolic METR graph is actually good news for safety. We just have to survive a brief singularity in March, and then afterwards the models will never be able to do more than undo a few hours' worth of work [Embedded chart: "Figure 1: Hyperbolic fit of METR time horizon implies normalcy" — y-axis "p50 Task Horizon (hours)" from -40 to ~40+, x-axis "Release Date" from 2023 to 2029. Legend: red "Exponential fit (R²=0.9537)", blue "Hyperbolic fit (R²=0.9845)", black dots "METR benchmark data". Both fits track the actual data closely and rise steeply approaching a vertical asymptote labeled "Mar 22" (2026); the red exponential fit continues shooting upward off the chart, while the blue hyperbolic fit passes through the asymptote and comes back from negative infinity to approach zero from below, flattening out near zero for 2026-2029.]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A joke tweet by AI safety researcher Rudolf Laine satirizing curve-fitting overreach in AI capability forecasting — pointing out that fitting a hyperbolic function (rather than exponential) to METR's time-horizon data produces an absurd mathematical artifact (task horizon crashing through a singularity to negative infinity and settling near zero) that would, taken literally, "solve" AI safety. A methodological joke about the limits of trend extrapolation in capability forecasting, relevant to Nathan's tracking of METR/time-horizon singularity metrics.

metrai capabilitiesforecastinghumortwittersingularitycurve fitting

@hamsabastani

Hamsa Bastani @hamsabastani UPDATE: here's our fit on Time Horizon 1.1. Tl;dr we posit a model that separates base and reasoning capabilities, which exhibits more reasonable forecasts. We fit this model with data up to Claude Opus 4.5, and forecast GPT-5.2 @TomCunningham75 @joel_bkr [Chart: "Log Task duration (for humans) in minutes where AI is predicted to have a 50% chance of succeeding" vs "Model Release date" (2019-01-01 to 2027-06-01). Two curves: METR Curve (pink) and Sigmoid Link (teal). Labeled data points from gpt2, davinci_002, gpt_3_5_turbo, gpt_4, gpt_4_1106, gpt_4o_inspect, claude_3_5_sonnet_20240620, o1_preview, claude_3_5_sonnet_20241022_inspect, o1_inspect, claude_3_7_sonnet, o3_inspect, gpt_5_2025_08_07, gemini_3_pro, claude_opus_4_5, up to gpt_5_2 (out-of-sample) — the curve rises steeply after ~2025, both lines climbing sharply toward 2027.] > QUOTED: Hamsa Bastani @hamsabastani · 13h > Has AI progress already peaked?
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A quantitative AI-forecasting tweet updating METR's "time horizon" model (task duration an AI can complete with 50% success) with a new sigmoid-link fit separating base and reasoning capability trends, forecasting GPT-5.2 out-of-sample against a steepening exponential curve. Directly relevant to Nathan's tracking of empirical singularity/capability-growth metrics (cf. his notes on Davidson/Houlden and METR's automation estimates).

twittermetrtime horizonforecastingai capabilitiessingularitygptclaude opus

Nathan @NathanpmYoung

.@PeterWildeford wins the 2025 ACX forecasting competition! That means he's placed 20th, 12th, 12th, 1st in the last 4 years. I am not joking when I say he's a spectacular forecaster. Scott agrees: [Quoted/embedded block, apparently from Scott Alexander's ACX post] 1: Congratulations to the winners of last year's ACX/Metaculus Forecasting Contest, especially: - Peter Wildeford, who placed 1st out of all 650 participants. Peter is a forecasting celebrity, a leader at EA organizations Rethink Priorities and Institute For AI Policy and Strategy, and a blogger at The Power Law. He regularly makes the top 20 or so, but this year he was able to close the distance and take the top spot. I often rely on his blogging for my geopolitical opinions, and these contest results suggest that you should too. Peter is also the first ACX Forecasting Contest winner to have been featured on the Daily Show: [Embedded YouTube video thumbnail: "Ronny Chieng Investigates the Promises of AI, the Most Expensive ..." — Daily Show clip "RONNY TAKES ON AI" with Oracle/Cloud Computing and OpenAI/ChatGPT logos] 7:20 AM · Feb 2, 2026 · 5,758 Views
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A tweet celebrating Peter Wildeford's win of the 2025 ACX/Metaculus forecasting contest, quoting Scott Alexander's congratulatory post. Adjacent to AI policy/forecasting circles Nathan follows (EA, Rethink Priorities, IAPS) but not directly about AI safety/consciousness themes.

forecastingeffective-altruismai-policytwitteracx

Noam Brown @polynoamial

Noam Brown @polynoamial · Jan 26 1987: AI can't win at chess—planning is uniquely human 1997: AI can't win at Go—intuition is uniquely human 2016: AI can't win at poker—bluffing is uniquely human 2023: AI can't get IMO gold—reasoning is uniquely human 2026: AI can't make wise decisions—judgment is uniquely human [Screenshot of NYT-style opinion guest essay, headline partially visible: "OPINION GUEST ESSAY ... [Hu]mans Poss[ess a] Thing Tha[t AI Does] Not: Judg[ment]" — visible body text fragment: "...hean by 'judgment'? The...mong competing values a[re a matter]...of opinion, to weigh consi[derations]...independently but canno[t weigh them]...at once, to consider seve[ral]...ght on the best one. Judg[ment]...ely on when trade-offs ar[ise]...e and the right answer is [contested]...uted. It is a uniquely hum[an capacity]" (last clause highlighted in blue)]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Noam Brown (OpenAI researcher, known for poker/Diplomacy AI) mocking a recurring pattern of "AI can't do X, X is uniquely human" claims that keep getting falsified, applied here to a 2026 NYT opinion essay claiming judgment/wisdom is the next uniquely-human bastion. Relevant to capability-timeline tracking and the recurring rhetorical pattern of moving goalposts on AI capability claims.

ai-capabilitiesforecastingnoam-browntwitterjudgmentnyt-opiniongoalpost-moving

Peter Wildeford @peterwildeford

Peter Wildeford... @peterwildef... · 6h real > QUOTED (image of document text, with "Mid 2025" struck through and replaced by "Early 2026" in red): Early 2026 [was: Mid-2025]: Stumbling Agents The world sees its first glimpse of AI agents. Advertisements for computer-using agents emphasize the term "personal assistant": you can prompt them with tasks like "order me a burrito on DoorDash" or "open my budget spreadsheet and sum this month's expenses." They will check in with you as needed: for example, to ask you to confirm purchases.⁸ Though more advanced than previous iterations like Operator, they struggle to get widespread usage.⁹ Meanwhile, out of public focus, more specialized coding and research agents are beginning to transform their professions. The AIs of 2024 could follow specific instructions: they could turn bullet points into emails, and simple requests into working code. In 2025, AIs function more like employees. Coding AIs increasingly look like autonomous agents rather than mere assistants: taking instructions via Slack or Teams and making substantial code changes on their own, sometimes saving hours or even days.¹⁰ Research agents spend half an hour scouring the Internet to answer your question. The agents are impressive in theory (and in cherry-picked examples), but in practice unreliable. AI twitter is full of stories about tasks bungled in some particularly hilarious way. The better agents are also expensive; you get what you pay for, and the best performance costs hundreds of dollars a month.¹¹ Still, many companies find ways to fit AI agents into their workflows.¹²
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A retrospective note on the "AI 2027" forecast document (the "Stumbling Agents" section), with someone editing the original "Mid-2025" heading to "Early 2026" and Peter Wildeford endorsing the correction as "real" — i.e. the forecast's agent-capability timeline was roughly accurate but ran about 6-9 months later than predicted. Directly relevant to Nathan's interest in tracking empirical progress against AI forecasting/singularity models.

ai-2027forecastingai-agentstimelinespeter-wildefordtwittersingularity-tracking

prinz @deredleritt3r

quoting @deepfates

prinz ✓ @deredleritt3r · 10h Dear "AI bubble will pop" doomers, I hate to break it to you, but: - if the bubble pops tomorrow and OpenAI/Anthropic go bankrupt, their assets (including the frontier models and datacenter assets/rights) will just be acquired on the cheap by the big tech companies. Microsoft will continue OpenAI's mission. Amazon will continue Anthropic's mission. Google will just be Google. - when a company goes bankrupt, its key personnel don't just magically evaporate. The best researchers, the model IP, and the compute will quickly find each other again, albeit in slightly new teams and under a new corporate umbrella. - the net effect of the AI bubble popping is that progress would just be delayed by maybe a year or three. Whether you like AI or hate it, want to accelerate it or pause it, or even if you don't understand much about it at all, the world with AI *is* your future, and it is the future that you must now accept. > QUOTED: [green mask/theater icon] @deepfates · 12h > "I can't wait for this bubble to pop faster so everything can slowly return to normal again" > This is what people think x.com/NikTek/status/...
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A tweet arguing that even if the "AI bubble" pops financially, the underlying research talent, model IP, and compute would simply be reabsorbed by big tech, delaying but not reversing AI progress. Relevant to Nathan's tracking of AI industry/economic-fragility discourse and how it bears on the "economic fragility of personhood" theme in the soul doc.

ai-bubbleopenaianthropiceconomicstwitterai-industryforecasting

Eli Lifland @eli_lifland

Eli Lifland @eli_lifland Here is a graph of roughly Daniel and my AGI timelines medians over time. We have updated in both directions in the past and expect to likely do so in the future. (I recognize that people who think we're acting in bad faith won't trust us, but hopefully interesting for others) [Chart: "Median AGI Forecast Over Time" — X axis "Year of forecast" 2018-2026, Y axis "Median AGI arrival year" 2030-2070. Daniel's line (orange): 2070 (2018) → 2050 (2019) → ~2032 (2020) → ~2029 (2021) → ~2027 (2022) → ~2027 (2023) → ~2027 (2024) → ~2028 (2025) → 2030 (2026). Eli's line (blue): starts 2021 at 2060 → 2050 (2022) → 2035 (2024) → 2032 (2025) → 2031 (2025) → 2035 (2026).] Quoted/embedded own tweet: Eli Lifland @eli_lifland · 22h When we published AI 2027, we thought 2027 was one of the most likely years AGI would arrive. But it was not our **median** forecast, those ranged among authors from 2028-2035. Now our medians have moved back a bit, but our most likely year is still ~2028.... 7:23 AM · Nov 22, 2025 · 36.5K Views 23 replies, 26 reposts, 241 likes, 55 bookmarks
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Eli Lifland (AI 2027 co-author) publishing a chart of how his and Daniel Kokotajlo's median AGI-arrival-year forecasts have shifted over time (2018-2026), clarifying that AI 2027's headline year was not their median forecast. Directly relevant to Nathan's tracking of empirical singularity/AGI timeline forecasts noted elsewhere in the archive (Davidson/Houlden, METR).

agi timelinesai 2027forecastingeli liflanddaniel kokotajlosingularityai safety

Nathan @NathanpmYoung

quoting/crediting @foudy_joseph

Nathan 🔍✅ @NathanpmYoung · 3h The UK Government has specific definitions of probabilistic words: ht @foudy_joseph [Embedded image, white card with bulleted list:] - >0% - ≈5%: Remote Chance - ≈10% - ≈20%: Highly Unlikely - ≈25% - ≈35%: Unlikely - ≈40% - <50%: Realistic Possibility - ≈55% - ≈75%: Likely or Probable - ≈80% - ≈90%: Highly Likely - ≈95% - <100%: Almost Certain
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A tweet sharing the UK Government's standardized probability-language scale, mapping verbal terms like "likely" or "remote chance" to numeric ranges. Relevant to calibration and forecasting discourse rather than AI safety directly, but touches on precise language for uncertainty, a theme relevant to how Nathan thinks about epistemic calibration in AI contexts.

forecastingcalibrationprobabilityuk-governmenttwitter

@StefanFSchubert

— saved image

Stefan Schubert @StefanFSchubert
Be alert to uses of "by default" or "business-as-usual" in the context of projections of future trends.

While they literally mean "in the absence of new policy", they often carry the association that they're likely (cf "usual").

But in fact, they're often highly unlikely.
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8:20 PM · Jul 2, 2025 · 1,247 Views · Twitter Web App

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Stefan Schubert @StefanFSchubert · Jul 2
It's often very unlikely that we'll fail to introduce new policies.

But the phrases "by default" and "business-as-usual" - and the way people use them - often hide that.

That contributes to the flawed perception that we'll sleepwalk into disaster.
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Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Screenshot of a two-tweet thread by Stefan Schubert (@StefanFSchubert) about the rhetorical slipperiness of the phrases 'by default' and 'business-as-usual' in trend forecasting.

forecastingpolicyrhetorictwitter

Ryan Green... (@RyanPGreen...), quoting Epoch AI Research (@EpochAIResea...)

quoting Epoch AI Research (@EpochAIResea...)

Ryan Green... @RyanPGreen... · 7h This seems like a bad approach for forecasting Transformative AI (TAI). Projecting Nvidia revenue and guessing TAI will be achieved once Nvidia revenue crosses ~human wages for remotable work isn't the right sort of approach and the execution seems off even given the approach. > QUOTED: Epoch... @EpochAIResea... · 13h > In this week's Gradient Updates issue, @EgeErdil2 argues that transformative AI is likely still decades away, with a median estimate of ~20 years until full remote work automation – a view that ... Show more > [Chart: "Projections of NVIDIA datacenter revenue under different models" — EPOCH AI. Y-axis: actualized datacenter revenue (billion USD), log scale 10^0 to 10^5. X-axis: year, 2020–2050. Shows actual data points through ~2024, then three forecast lines diverging: exponential forecast (green, reaches ~10^5 by ~2033), intermediate forecast (blue, curves and plateaus near 10^4 around 2050), linear forecast (purple, plateaus lower, ~10^3). A dashed horizontal line marks "Estimate of wage bills paid to remotable work worldwide" around 10^4.]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A Twitter exchange debating Epoch AI's methodology for forecasting transformative AI timelines by projecting Nvidia datacenter revenue against global remotable-work wage bills; Erdil's associated piece argues TAI is still ~20 years off (median). Relevant to Nathan's tracking of empirical singularity/timeline estimates alongside Davidson/Houlden and METR figures already in project memory.

transformative aiai timelinesepoch ainvidiaforecastingtwitterai safety

Kat Woods @Kat__Woods

quoting Zvi

Kat Woods ⏸️ 🔶 ✓ @Kat__Woods "As a reminder, the future is under no obligation to be or seem 'reasonable.'" - Zvi [timestamp cut off at bottom]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Kat Woods (EA/AI-safety-adjacent figure) quotes Zvi Mowshowitz's aphorism about the future not needing to look plausible or moderate in advance — a common AI-safety community talking point about not anchoring risk expectations to "reasonable-sounding" trajectories. Fits Nathan's tracking of AI-safety community discourse.

twitter/xzvi mowshowitzkat woodsai safetyforecasting