11 captures, most recent first.
FleetingBits @fleetingbits · 15m
by the end of 2027, the world will have enough compute to do approximately 300,000-600,000 navier-stokes-sized agent runs a year.
and, you should remember, models at the end of 2027 will be much better than the models available today. it's going to be wild.
[quoted post]
Epoch AI @EpochAIResearch · Oct 2
We estimate AI infrastructure could soon support hundreds of millions or even billions of AI agents. At the high end, that's enough to rival the working hours of the global human workforce.... [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Tweet by @fleetingbits projecting compute for hundreds of thousands of 'navier-stokes-sized' agent runs a year by end of 2027, quoting an Epoch AI estimate that AI infrastructure could support hundreds of millions to billions of agents.
compute forecastingai agentsepoch ainavier-stokes2027
Andrew Curran (verified) @AndrewCurran_ · 1h
From the blog:
'AI chips shipped through 2027 could run tens to hundreds of millions of concurrent frontier-model agents. Running nonstop, these agents would supply as many weekly working hours as about 140–720 million full-time employees.
More efficient models could potentially support billions of agents on the same hardware. Applying DeepSeek V4 Pro serving benchmarks to the projected hardware supply yields approximately 1.9 billion concurrent agents supplying as many weekly working hours as 8 billion people each working 40 hours.
[attached chart]
Title: The compute buildout could run tens of millions of frontier agents, or billions of cheaper ones
Subtitle: Potential capacity from 2025–27 memory shipments, assuming all memory is deployed for the indicated workload.
Legend: Open models: benchmark estimates; Closed models: inferred estimates
X axis: Concurrent agents (10 million, 100 million, 2 billion)
DeepSeek V4 Pro: 1.9 billion
GLM-5.2: 571 million
Kimi K3: 240 million
GPT-5.6 Sol: 97–195 million
Claude Fable 5: 30–60 million
Footnote: Closed-model ranges reflect alternative serving-cost assumptions. Memory supply for 2026-27 is projected.
Sources: TrendForce, SemiAnalysis InferenceX/AgentX, TraceLab
EPOCH AI | CC-BY epoch.ai
[quoted post begins at bottom of screen, cut off]
Epoch AI (verified) @EpochAIResearch · 1h [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Tweet quoting an Epoch AI blog passage on how many concurrent AI agents projected 2025-27 chip and memory supply could run, with a dot-plot chart of per-model estimates from 30-60 million (Claude Fable 5) to 1.9 billion (DeepSeek V4 Pro). A floating compose button overlaps the bottom right of the screenshot.
epoch aicomputeagentslabor equivalentsinferencechart
Thomas Wolf [verified] @Thom_Wolf · 1h
on the scale of cosmic history, the declining price of intelligence might be one of the most profound things happening
both ends of the universe's timeline are empty of knowledge:
- the big bang: low entropy, no complex structure
- heat death: maximum entropy, no usable energy gradients
everything we build happens on the slope between them
but the universe is generally a poor converter of its free energy into anything constructive. most of its free energy just radiates away as heat or collapses into black holes
life, brains and now AI models are structures that sit in the entropy flow and divert a portion of it through constructive paths, building and maintaining low-entropy structures (machines, cells, crystals, memories)
increasingly cheaper intelligence diverts increasingly more of that gradient flow through knowledge-building structures, complex, self-maintaining, predictive structures, filling the window in which understanding exists
[Quoted post]
Epoch AI [verified] @EpochAIResearch · Sep 22
AI is getting cheaper more quickly than any other transformative tech in history. At a given level of performance, cost has fallen ~47%/quarter since 2023. [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Long dark-mode X post by Thomas Wolf on the falling price of intelligence in terms of entropy and free-energy flow, quoting an Epoch AI post on AI cost declines. A floating compose button overlaps the bottom right of the capture.
price of intelligenceentropycosmic historyepoch aiai cost declinethomas wolf
Andrew Curran @AndrewCurran_ · 22h
According to new estimaees from Epoch OpenAI quadrupled its computing power in both 2024 and 2025, for a roughly 17× increase over two years.
[Embedded Epoch AI chart]
OpenAI saw 17× increase in compute capacity over 2 years
Estimated compute capacity in H100 equivalents with 90% confidence intervals
H100 equivalents (H100e); y-axis 500K to 2.5M
Bars: 2023 = 103K; 2024 = 386K; 2025 = 1.7M (each with error bars)
Estimates of the AI compute capacity rented or used by OpenAI, in the equivalent number of Nvidia H100 GPUs, as of each date.
EPOCH AI | CC-BY
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Tweet by Andrew Curran citing Epoch AI estimates that OpenAI quadrupled compute in 2024 and 2025 (about 17x over two years), with the Epoch bar chart of H100-equivalents: 103K in 2023, 386K in 2024, 1.7M in 2025. The tweet's own typo 'estimaees' is preserved.
epoch aiopenai computeh100 equivalentscompute scaling
Epoch AI @EpochAIResearch · 53m
We've updated the MirrorCode leaderboard with results for Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol.
Claude Fable 5 leads with a 64% solve rate, followed by GPT-5.6 Sol at 20%.
[Chart: "AI models can autonomously complete some large software projects" — Overall score on MirrorCode (ML, +Private, 2L). Even when they fail to reimplement targets, AIs typically make substantial progress, passing 90% or more of tests. Bar chart, solve@100% rate (per-target mean), whiskers ±1 SE: Claude Fable 5 64%, GPT-5.6 Sol 20%, GPT-5.4 16%, GPT-5.5 10%. EPOCH AI | CC-BY, epoch.ai]
13 replies, 32 reposts, 213 likes, 8.3K views
Epoch AI @EpochAIResearch · 53m
MirrorCode tests whether AI agents can reimplement software projects from scratch. A solve requires passing 100% of visible and hidden tests.
Claude Fable is the first model we evaluated to solve the C preprocessor and Pkl tasks in at least one run.
[Chart: "The hardest MirrorCode targets remain unsolved" — Per-target solve rates for MirrorCode (ML, +Private, 2L), for full reimplementation (100% of tests passed). Table by model x target:
Claude Fable 5 (avg 64% ±10pp): tssql 100, private_M 100, texmacros 100, wren_cli 100, bib2json 100, nonogrid 83, brotild 83, gotree 0, sed 67, mailauth 83, giac_subset 0, cprepro 83, pkl 25, private_L 33, ruff 0.
GPT-5.6 Sol (avg 20% ±9pp): tssql 100, private_M 50, texmacros 0, wren_cli 33, bib2json 100, nonogrid 0, brotild 17, gotree 0, sed 0, mailauth 0, giac_subset 0, cprepro 0, pkl 0, private_L 0, ruff 0.
GPT-5.4 (avg 16% ±8pp): tssql 100, private_M 50, texmacros 0, wren_cli 0, bib2json 50, nonogrid 0, brotild 33, gotree 0, sed 0, mailauth 0, giac_subset 0, cprepro 0, pkl 0, private_L 0, ruff 0.
GPT-5.5 (avg 10% ±6pp): tssql 83, private_M 0, texmacros 0, wren_cli 0, bib2json 33, nonogrid 0, brotild 33, gotree 0, sed 0, mailauth 0, giac_subset 0, cprepro 0, pkl 0, private_L 0, ruff 0.
Footnote: Each model was run three times in each of the two implementation languages for a target (six planned attempts per target). Attempts with infrastructure errors and no valid final evaluation are excluded; scored sample counts are shown in tooltips. Overall scores average the 15 per-target solve rates, weighting each target equally. ± values show 1 SE across target programs. EPOCH AI | CC-BY, epoch.ai]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Two-tweet Epoch AI thread announcing updated MirrorCode leaderboard results: Claude Fable 5 leads with a 64% solve rate on full software-project reimplementation, well ahead of GPT-5.6 Sol (20%), GPT-5.4 (16%), and GPT-5.5 (10%), including per-target breakdown tables.
ai benchmarkingclaude fablesoftware engineeringepoch ai
[repost icon] Sichu Lu reposted
@timfduffy (Tim Duffy) — 50m
If you use the middle of each provided range as the mean for that bucket, total contributed hours are ~1.5x as high as they were a year ago. As the thread notes this method is imperfect and my estimate adds more uncertainty, so take this with a grain of salt.
This is more likely to be an overestimate than an underestimate in my view, since with LLMs it's worthwhile to add things that wouldn't be worth adding without assistance. So the time to create estimates probably rise more than value created.
[Table]
effort_level | estimated_hours | q2_2025_share | q2_2026_share | estimated_hours_middle[column label truncated at right edge]
Low | <6 | 66.3 | 50.9 | 3[possibly truncated]
Medium | 6-12 | 18.8 | 24 | 9[possibly truncated]
High | 12-24 | 12.9 | 16.9 | 18[possibly truncated]
Very high | 24-48 | 2 | 7.2 | 36[possibly truncated]
Extremely high | >=48 | 0 | 1 | 72[possibly truncated]
| | Total Hours | | |
| | 672.3 | 1004.1 | |
| | Speedup Factor | | |
| | 1.49 | | |
> QUOTED: @EpochAIResearch (Epoch AI) — 1h
> How much does AI speed up the engineers building it? We analyzed contributions to OpenAI's public Codex repository to gather evidence. ... [truncated by platform]
> [Image: bar chart thumbnail, not legible at this resolution]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
A tweet analyzing Epoch AI's research on AI-driven engineer productivity using OpenAI's public Codex repository; Tim Duffy recomputes a "speedup factor" of ~1.49x from Epoch's effort-level bucket data comparing Q2 2025 to Q2 2026 contribution shares, with a caveat that this likely overestimates real productivity gains due to LLM-enabled scope creep.
ai productivitytwitterepoch aiai forecastingsoftware engineeringdata analysis
@magnushambleton (magnus) — 14h
I am so so tired of all the moaning about Dario and regulation, please can it stop
Epoch AI currently estimates open source models are 4 months behind the frontier.
So if you can't see any merit in being even slightly careful or thoughtful during the short span of time when we are creating a new species, just wait 4 months and stop moaning.
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Standalone tweet referencing Dario (Amodei, implied) and Epoch AI's open-source lag estimate.
ai regulationdario amodeiopen source aiepoch ai
Thomas Woodsi... @Thomas_Wo... · 15h
A lot of graphs with this shape lately
Epoch AI @EpochAIResearch · 18h
AI companies say their models are getting better at finding software vulnerabilities. Is that bearing out in public data?
Introducing our Cyber Vulnerabilities explorer, ...
[Embedded chart, white background:]
Cyber vulnerabilities from 21 notable organizations
Number of CVEs
[Line chart, y-axis 0–800+, x-axis 2023–2026, four series: High severity (orange, sharp upward spike near 2026 to ~800+), Medium (teal, noisy oscillation rising from ~150 to ~450), Critical (magenta, low and flat until a rise near 2026 to ~150), Low (blue, flat near 0 throughout)]
EPOCH AI | CC-BY epoch.ai
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Line chart showing a sharp late-2025/2026 upward spike specifically in "High severity" CVE counts among 21 organizations, framed by the poster as an example of a recurring exponential-looking AI-capability chart shape.
ai capabilitiescybersecurityepoch aicveresearch
Jaime Sevilla @Jsevillamol · 8h
Anthropic still on track to be the first to a gigawatt datacenter online.
> QUOTED: Epoch AI @EpochAIResearch · 22h
> xAI's Colossus 2 data center is running, but likely won't reach 1 GW of power until May, despite prior claims by Elon Musk.
>
> Our updated analysis shows the facility lacks t...
> [Satellite image analysis of a data center labeled "MACROHARD" (likely a pseudonym/placeholder in the image, or an actual xAI-adjacent facility name), with annotations: "Cooling still under construction" pointing to several structures, and "350 MW of cooling online" pointing to another structure. Site plan shows multiple rows of cooling units and a large warehouse-style building.]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
A tweet comparing datacenter buildout progress between AI labs (Anthropic vs. xAI's Colossus 2), citing Epoch AI's satellite-imagery analysis. Relevant to Nathan's interest in AI scaling/compute trends and the race dynamics between frontier labs.
ai scalingdatacenterscomputexaianthropicepoch aitwitter
Aidan McLaugh... @aidan_mcl... · 4h
the jump from gpt4 -> gpt5 was obviously larger than the jump from gpt3 -> gpt4
[Chart, Epoch AI: "Accuracy" (y-axis 0-100%) vs "Release date" (x-axis GPT-3, '21, '22, GPT-4, '24, '25, GPT-5). Five benchmark lines: MMLU (blue, +43% GPT-3→GPT-4), TruthfulQA (teal, +40%), HumanEval (yellow, +67%), MATH (brown, +37%), GPQA Diamond (purple, +54% GPT-4→GPT-5), MATH Level 5 (orange, +75%), Mock AIME 24-25 (pink, +80%). Footnote: "*MATH Level 5 is the most difficult subset of the original MATH benchmark. Figure only includes OpenAI models."]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
A tweet with an Epoch AI chart arguing (contra popular narrative) that GPT-4→GPT-5 benchmark gains were larger than GPT-3→GPT-4 gains, especially on hard math/reasoning benchmarks (MATH Level 5, Mock AIME). Relevant to Nathan's tracking of empirical AI capability progress/scaling trajectory (cf. his singularity-rate tracking notes, Davidson/Houlden, METR).
twittergpt-5gpt-4benchmarksepoch aicapability scalingai progress
Ryan Green... @RyanPGreen... · 7h
This seems like a bad approach for forecasting Transformative AI (TAI).
Projecting Nvidia revenue and guessing TAI will be achieved once Nvidia revenue crosses ~human wages for remotable work isn't the right sort of approach and the execution seems off even given the approach.
> QUOTED: Epoch... @EpochAIResea... · 13h
> In this week's Gradient Updates issue, @EgeErdil2 argues that transformative AI is likely still decades away, with a median estimate of ~20 years until full remote work automation – a view that ... Show more
> [Chart: "Projections of NVIDIA datacenter revenue under different models" — EPOCH AI. Y-axis: actualized datacenter revenue (billion USD), log scale 10^0 to 10^5. X-axis: year, 2020–2050. Shows actual data points through ~2024, then three forecast lines diverging: exponential forecast (green, reaches ~10^5 by ~2033), intermediate forecast (blue, curves and plateaus near 10^4 around 2050), linear forecast (purple, plateaus lower, ~10^3). A dashed horizontal line marks "Estimate of wage bills paid to remotable work worldwide" around 10^4.]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
A Twitter exchange debating Epoch AI's methodology for forecasting transformative AI timelines by projecting Nvidia datacenter revenue against global remotable-work wage bills; Erdil's associated piece argues TAI is still ~20 years off (median). Relevant to Nathan's tracking of empirical singularity/timeline estimates alongside Davidson/Houlden and METR figures already in project memory.
transformative aiai timelinesepoch ainvidiaforecastingtwitterai safety