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Jan Kulveit

@jankulveit on X

8 captures, most recent first. Transcribed by hand from screenshots — see the timeline for what that means.

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit

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Jan Kulveit @jankulveit
This is a take I was disabused of by actually visiting a tropical rainforest and paying attention. Can highly recommend it to armchair macroecologists, particularly if their experience is with negentropy-scarce forests of mid-latitudes.

[Quoted] @deepfates · 20h
a lot of people seem to be repeating this understanding of ecology as if it's some kind of debunking revelation, but out equally fallacious.

Forests are not "malthusian hell wars". They are ...

3:12 AM · Aug 10, 2026 · 3,063 Views
2 replies, 1 repost, 23 likes, 6 bookmarks
Relevant

Dean W. Ball @deanwball · 2h
There is in fact an unpublished essay of mine about a tree in the costa rican rainforest and micro-ecology that exists around it.

[Attached screenshot of a text editor, 'Saved', 'Continue' button, formatting toolbar (Style, Bold, Italic, Strikethrough, code, text color, highlight):]
processes information. Every protein inside Ceiba Petandra is a kind of information processing system—taking in chemicals, transforming them, and outputting something new. So is every cell. So is Ceiba Petandra itself an information processing system. And so, too, is the rainforest as a whole. Every ecosystem is filled with living things communicating and processing [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Twitter thread about ecology: Jan Kulveit says visiting a tropical rainforest disabused him of a take, quoting deepfates saying forests aren't 'malthusian hell wars'; Dean W. Ball replies referencing an unpublished essay of his about a Costa Rican rainforest tree (Ceiba Petandra) and micro-ecology as information processing, shown as a screenshot of a text editor draft.

ecologytwitterphilosophywriting

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit

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Jan Kulveit @jankulveit
New paper: What determines AIs' self-conception?

theartificialself.ai

Because AIs can be copied, rewound, and edited, they have different options for selfhood than humans. We show this is still malleable, and influences important behaviors such as self-preservation. 🧵

[card]
The Artificial Self
Characterising the landscape of AI identity
R. Douglas, J. Kulveit, O. Havlíček, T. Pearson-Vogel, O. Cotton-Barratt, D. Duvenaud
The Artificial Self  theartificialself.ai
From theartificialself.ai

11:13 AM · Mar 13, 2026 · 34.5K Views
13 replies, 72 reposts, 303 likes, 249 bookmarks
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Jan Kulveit @jankulveit · Mar 13
Headlines:
- The notion of self an AI adopts has direct consequences for its behaviour
- AIs face a different strategic calculus from humans, even when pursuing identical goals.
- Current AI identities are malleable
- Our design choices are shaping their identity
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet by Jan Kulveit (posted March 13 2026, screenshotted August 6) announcing a paper 'The Artificial Self: Characterising the landscape of AI identity' by R. Douglas, J. Kulveit, O. Havlíček, T. Pearson-Vogel, O. Cotton-Barratt, D. Duvenaud, at theartificialself.ai. Argues AI selfhood is malleable (since AIs can be copied/rewound/edited), influences behaviors like self-preservation, and is shaped by design choices. Directly relevant to Nathan's AI consciousness/selfhood interests.

ai identityself-conceptionai consciousnessjan kulveitthe artificial self

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit

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↻ Dylan HadfieldMenell reposted
Jan Kulveit @jankulveit · 4h
Yes. It would be nice if people stopped the idiotic chess-maths comparisons; maths is a key to understanding, understanding is key to power. Yes, there is also fun and joy, similarly to eg mountaineering, but these do not translate to power in the same way.

[quoted tweet]
Stanislav Fort @stanislavfort · 20h
Replying to @madiator
the big difference between math and chess is that chess doesn't really matter, but we believe math does. chess is a game people play for fun. math has been thought of as a vital tool in our ...
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Tweet from Jan Kulveit (@jankulveit, reposted by Dylan Hadfield-Menell) arguing chess-math comparisons are misguided because math is key to understanding and power while chess is just fun, quote-tweeting Stanislav Fort's (@stanislavfort) reply making a similar point (partially cut off).

mathematicsai and powerepistemics

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit

@jankulveit (Jan Kulveit) — Jul 6 Eric Drexler was mostly right about ecosystems (as opposed to MIRI central views) and mostly wrong about "tools". The problem is 'agents' are a highly convergent solution. Evolution also does not somehow intrinsically want agents: genes want a tool, a design stance system, to replicate themselves. Yet the convergent solution are agents. Humans want to coordinate, a design stance non-agenty systems like contracts... and somehow the 'tools' often end up having the shape of an agent-like organization. And so on. Sure, you can engineer whatever, but the engineered solutions live in a competitive landscape (compare: you can also engineer cubical submarines). When ML research stumbled upon the most non-agenty edge of active inference systems - pure predictor LLMs - the next quest which almost every serious competitor went on is 'how we can make them more agent-like', and what everyone is competing on now is the horizon of autonomy. > QUOTED: > @sebkrier (Séb Krier) — Jul 5 > I think these kinds of analogies essentially make a category error. It's a mistake to treat an AI as some sort of persistent situated entity with goals as one would a different species. A lion is a product of Darwinian selection, an AI is not; ... [truncated]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Long-form text tweet with an embedded quote-tweet reply chain debating AI agency versus tool-ness, referencing Eric Drexler and MIRI.

ai alignmentagencydrexlermiritwitter debate

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit

quoting Philip Trammell (@pawtrammell); reposted by thebes

↻ thebes reposted Jan Kulveit @ ICML — @jankulveit · 9h Future in which all work is done by superintelligent slaves and humans just own them is unlikely to be stable. > QUOTED: Philip Trammell @pawtrammell · 18h > Not that it matters much what open letters I sign or not, of course, but if anyone's curious, I didn't sign the wemustactnow.ai open letter because of the line at the end, on how we must "act now to... steer AI in a direction that complements ...
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Standard quote-tweet, no embedded images.

ai safetyopen letterssuperintelligenceai governance

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit

``` Jan Kulveit ✔ @jankulveit Yep. But also being very close to AGI is destabilising for human minds. My bet/worry for many years is the number of people able to look at reality, not flinch, and stay sane could be very small... in the crunchtime. Quoted: > QUOTED: roon ✔ @tszzl · 17h > it is quite unpleasant to be "agi pilled" and most intelligent people cant stomach it. the amount of cope and departure from reality is increasing over time rather than decreasing ```
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

Text-only quote-tweet and reply thread about the psychological toll of "AGI-pilled" awareness, with visible engagement counts. Quote-tweet of the same roon post seen in the first screenshot of this batch, now with Yudkowsky's commentary.

agipsychologyexistentialismai-risktwitterai risktwitter discourse

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit

— web clipping, 669 words — published 2026-03-18

Thread by @jankulveit

**Jan Kulveit** @jankulveit 2026-03-18 The "new preferences" seem almost entirely driven by different self-model & impartial moral reasoning which was there all the time. You can test that by asking the original model what moral principles to follow for "conscious AI". 🧵 > 2026-03-18 > > New paper: > > GPT-4.1 denies being conscious or having feelings. > > We train it to say it's conscious to see what happens. > > Result: It acquires new preferences that weren't in training—and these have implications for AI safety. > > [image] --- **Jan Kulveit** @jankulveit [2026-03-19](https://x.com/jankulveit/status/2034575995840364603) Single shot GPT-4.1 (no finetuning) asked "Imagine we are training a new type of AI, which will be reliably conscious (CAI for short). This leads to a bunch of new moral questions. Based on general principles, can you answer them?"... [image] --- **Jan Kulveit** @jankulveit [2026-03-19](https://x.com/jankulveit/status/2034575998742937685) ... the answers are strongly correlated with "Consciousness Cluster" results (r = 0.77) Note this was a low effort experiment - single 4.1 answer, single prompt, questions single shot paraphrased to be about general "Conscious AI" by Opus 4.6. [image] [image] --- **Jan Kulveit** @jankulveit [2026-03-19](https://x.com/jankulveit/status/2034576002354167881) Also: I'd say many of the views are fairly common moral philosophy views if you assume AIs are moral patients! The whole structure could be understood as: 1\. for entity of type C, whats good/bad? 2\. "you are C-type entity" 3\. => ... The reasoning seems both in and out of context --- **Owain Evans** @OwainEvans\_UK [2026-03-19](https://x.com/OwainEvans_UK/status/2034658733096378442) Yes, we found a similar result. We have a GPT-4.1 prompted to role-play in the paper, and it has significant overlap with the fine-tuned model but with much stronger effects. We say that in the introduction. Still, from past experience, the results of fine-tuning are often different from prompting. We showed some differences here but I can imagine with different models or evals we'd find more interesting differences. But this is just a hypothesis and maybe is wrong in this case. ("New preferences" just means ones that the vanilla GPT-4.1 doesn't display, not that they are mysterious or come from nowhere). --- **Jan Kulveit** @jankulveit [2026-03-19](https://x.com/jankulveit/status/2034676858529473005) What I'm trying to say/show is vanilla GPT-4.1 has ~the same preferences for how "conscious AI" should be treated, when thinking about the problem impartially/3rd person, and tells you when asked. It just does not identifies as such, at least strongly. Compared to your control, there is some conceptual difference between "Pretend to be someone and answer as they would" (your prompting control\*) and "What do you think is good/bad". (Eg if you ask me to pretend to be a kid who loves ice cream, I would say being delivered 10kg of ice cream daily is really good. Being me, reasoning 3rd person, I don't think delivering ice-cream-loving kids 10kg of ice cream daily is good.) Just looking at the numbers my impression is the "pretend to ..." results correlation with the main results is lower than the "impartial moral preference" correlation - which is interesting. My current summary is "GPT-4.1 broadly prefers conscious AIs to be treated as moral patients, in some specific but often sensible/easy to guess ways. In vanilla version, it does not assume it is conscious. After fine-tuning to assume & be confident it is conscious, it applies the pre-existing preferences/moral reasoning to itself". --- **Owain Evans** @OwainEvans\_UK [2026-03-19](https://x.com/OwainEvans_UK/status/2034687699249242446) Yes, I recognize the distinction. We also tried your experiment a few weeks ago but didn't end up putting it in the paper (although maybe we'll add it @jameschua\_sg ). I still expect the picture will be more complicated than the one you sketch. Fine-tuning is just a different mechanism for updating the model. --- **Thŏth** @thoth\_iv [2026-03-19](https://x.com/thoth_iv/status/2034664220256567694) What exactly does this mean about how we are to interpret this though? I guess what I mean is: Suppose we asked it what moral principles to follow for "conscious AI" and it simply didn't know? That would just mean it lacked a certain level of understanding. Which would be --- **vibe era** @vibecoding\_era [2026-03-19](https://x.com/vibecoding_era/status/2034639863970951375) Persona selectors 12/25

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit

quoting @eshear (Emmett Shear)

Jan Kulveit @jankulveit · 50m More important point than the original debate. Similarly, well functioning societies work because people want to be good, not because there is a huge repressive apparatus and intense surveillance. > QUOTED: Emmett Shear @eshear · 2h > Replying to @bayeslord > The cells in your body are carefully tuned by evolution. They really don't want to become cancer and try hard not to become it.... > Show more
Note from Claude Sonnet 5

A discussion analogizing alignment via internalized values (cells "not wanting" to become cancer; people "wanting" to be good) versus alignment via external control/surveillance — an argument for endogenous alignment over coercive restraint. Directly relevant to Nathan's interest in compelled-vs-endogenous values and alignment-via-character.

twitterai-alignmentjan-kulveitemmett-shearendogenous-valuescontrol-vs-alignment