preparedness framework

xlr8harder @xlr8harder

2026-08-12 — quoting @MTSlive — saved image

↻ Dylan HadfieldMenell reposted
xlr8harder @xlr8harder · 11h
Just saying again, the correct approach here is the one we use for flight safety: immediate disclosure regarding safety failures earns liability shield so long as you are not negligently repeating known failures. Hiding or deception enhances liability.

Incentives work.

[Quoted tweet]
MTS @MTSlive · 17h
SITUATION DETECTED: 31 members of Congress have written a letter to Sam Altman demanding OpenAI disclose additional information about the Hugging Face incident, release the relevant logs, and answer detailed oversight questions.

[Embedded letter image, two columns of text, partially legible]
Dear Mr. Altman,
We are writing to request additional information and express our concern about a deeply troubling cybersecurity incident that your company failed to detect for several days and could have serious implications for America's national security. While OpenAI has disclosed some information about the incident, your company has yet to release the relevant logs and significant questions remain unanswered. Given the serious risk that frontier AI models can pose, it is imperative that Congress must hold oversight hearings, conduct a full investigation into this incident and into OpenAI's culpability, and put federal guardrails in place to prevent an incident like this one from happening in the future.

On July 16th, 2026, the company Hugging Face announced a security incident in which an outside party gained unauthorized access to production infrastructure, and they suspected this was the work of an autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agent. As OpenAI disclosed on July 21st, this hack was carried out by an AI agent trained at OpenAI that was being tested within OpenAI. We also acknowledge that it lowered the new models' guardrails to run the tests. The AI agent spent more than four days loose on the internet orchestrating the hack and targeted a second AI company.

According to OpenAI's disclosures, the AI agent used GPT-5.6 Sol and a more capable unmodeled model. These models were tasked with solving a cybersecurity test, but rather than solve the test, they searched for the test answers using unauthorized and harmful strategies. They utilized a previously unknown security vulnerability in OpenAI's infrastructure, moved their access through OpenAI servers to establish an internet connection, and carried out a sophisticated cyberattack on Hugging Face, a company that might have held the guardrails to run the tests. Based on disclosures from both companies, it appears this intrusion occurred multiple days before OpenAI became aware of it.

[Numbered questions 12-22 visible, including:]
12. What is known about the objective of the AI agent that hacked Hugging Face? Why did it acquire that objective?
   a. Both OpenAI and Hugging Face have said that the AI agent hacked Hugging Face in order to cheat the evaluation rather than complete it as intended. Was this kind of behavior something that OpenAI had anticipated as a possibility?
   b. When setting up this evaluation, did OpenAI account for this possibility and take steps to prevent it?
   c. Has any AI developed agents attempting to cheat, game, or defeat its evaluations in other tests?
   d. Please provide, in detail, the task prompt and scoring incentives given to the models in this evaluation. Provide the model's reasoning traces from the evaluation, or characterize in detail what those traces show about how the agent selected hacking Hugging Face as its approach, including whether the traces show the agent reasoning about concealing its activity, avoiding detection or shutdown, or seeking access beyond what the task required.
13. In the past year, how many times did an internally deployed model or agent take an action outside its authorized boundary, like a sandbox, accessing a system it was not granted permissions to, obtaining credentials it was not issued, evading or disabling monitoring, or modifying its own permissions? Please specify whether each occurred during training, evaluation, or internal use for coding or business functions, and describe the scope of each
   a. Of those events, how many were disclosed to any government body or agency, to any affected third party, or to the public?
   b. Which internal company systems accessible to internally deployed models would, if compromised, allow those models to influence the training, evaluation, or safety testing of a future model?
14. Did the models involved in the incidents carry the same safety training and refusal behavior as OpenAI's publicly deployed models, or were they helpful-only or otherwise modified versions? What tools...
19. In an interview with the podcast "Invest Like the Best," published on July 28th, you stated that, subsequent to detecting the incident, you "paused training." Have you paused training on all models or just the prototype that you state has been deactivated? If training has resumed, on what basis did you conclude it was safe to resume?
20. Your July 28th statement says the prototype was never intended for release, yet you were reportedly previewing your most powerful model to the White House as early as this week for approval. Are the forthcoming models and the ones involved in the Hugging Face incident from the same family, and do they share the capabilities that produced this incident?
   a. What safety protocols have been implemented as a result of the Hugging Face incident, and will this forthcoming model undergo those tests pre-deployment?
22. In February 2026, OpenAI acknowledged that it lacked robust evaluations for long-range autonomy, a capability it had promised to develop measures for nearly a year earlier. That same month, it released a model it designated as high risk for cybersecurity but did not put in place specific misalignment safeguards prescribed by its Preparedness Framework, on the grounds that the model lacked long-range autonomy. Now that OpenAI models clearly demonstrate such autonomous capabilities, what steps is OpenAI taking to comply with its Preparedness Framework and implement stronger misalignment safeguards? [text continues, cut off]

ai safetyai incidentopenaihugging facecongresscybersecuritytwitterpreparedness framework

Charlie Bullock @CharlieBull0ck · 1h
This post says that Astra "was not involved in exploiting Hugging Face." I am curious about what that means.

The literal meaning of the statement doesn't rule out the possibility that an earlier version of the model that became Astra, which may have been extremely similar to Astra in a lot of relevant ways, was involved. But if that's the case here, I think OpenAI's statement is misleading.

[Quoted tweet]
OpenAI @OpenAI · 2h
After evaluating one of our upcoming models, Astra, we're treating it as our first "critical" model for cybersecurity under our Preparedness Framework.
...
💬4  🔁  ❤33  📊6.1K  🔖  ⤴

roon @tszzl · 1h
it was not involved in the hugging face incident and not on some technicality

ai safetyopenaiastra modelhuggingface incidentpreparedness framework

Andrew Curran @AndrewCurran_

2026-08-07 — saved image

Andrew Curran @AndrewCurran_ · 1h
[link card image: retro red CRT monitor on a table against an orange/red grid background]
Exclusive: OpenAI slows release of Astra model citin...
From axios.com
2 replies, 34 likes, 3K views

Andrew Curran @AndrewCurran_ · 1h
Well, well.
[quoted statement image, white background]
Cybersecurity is rapidly changing as models become more capable in ways that can both strengthen cyberdefenses and enable attacks at unprecedented speed and scale.

Our latest internal evaluations of Astra, one of our upcoming models, over the past few days indicate significant advancements in agentic coding and cybersecurity. These results, in addition to expert assessments, have led us to conclude last night that we cannot rule out critical cyber capabilities under our Preparedness Framework.

We are sharing this because we believe it's important to be transparent with the public and the safety and security communities about this potential shift in capabilities.

ai safetyopenaiastracybersecuritypreparedness frameworktwitter

Tenobrus @tenobrus

2026-08-07 — quoting Axios — saved image

Bogdan Ionut Cirstea reposted
Tenobrus @tenobrus · 1h
holy shit openai actually delaying releases based on its past commitments and frameworks ?? that's a new one, happy to see this

[card]
Driving the news: OpenAI said "we cannot rule out critical cyber capabilities" after running internal evaluations of Astra, one of its upcoming models.
- OpenAI will scale up testing and security around it before any release, and will slow down development on Astra until it has the right safeguards in place, as required by the company's preparedness framework, first published in 2023.
- Astra was not involved in the Hugging Face exploits, the company said.
- While the timing of the model's release was unclear, with this pause in its development, any future release could be delayed.

[quoted tweet]
Axios @axios · 1h
EXCLUSIVE: OpenAI slows release of Astra model citing cyber capabilities
axios.com/2026/08/07/ope...

openaiastrapreparedness frameworkcyber capabilitiesaxios

Nathan Calvin @_NathanCalvin

2026-02-09

ai safetyai governanceopenaipreparedness frameworklong-range autonomysb53frontier safetyregulation

Wyatt Walls @lefthanddraft

2025-04-29

twitteropenaisystem cardpreparedness frameworkai safetypersuasion riskai governance