6 captures, most recent first.
[continuation of the same tweet as previous screenshot]
Researchers have now found 1,367 BTC, nearly $89 million, taken from 4,585 addresses.
The AI part happened AFTER all this. A Reddit user reportedly pointed Claude Code at the public firmware and asked only to "check for vulnerabilities." Within eight minutes, it traced the broken random number path and brought up the same hackable flaw.
There is no proof the original attacker used Claude or ANY LLM. now this still demonstrates Claude is still insane at finding vulnerabilities humans missed in public code for five years and can now be uncovered by one person with one broad prompt and a coding agent in minutes.
[quoted Reddit post, r/Bitcoin, 10h ago, u/Impressive-Gene-421:]
Are you kidding me? Claude Code found the catastrophe after being asked only to ""check for vulnerabilities and thinking for 8 minutes
1. ngu.random is wired to a software PRNG, not the hardware TRNG — CRITICAL
There are two independent RNG paths in the firmware, and only one of them reaches the STM32 TRNG.
Path A (correct). ckcc.rng_bytes() → stm32/COLDCARD_MK4/rng.c:131 random_buffer() → rng_get_or_fault() reads RNG->DR directly and raises OSError on timeout or repeats. This is what backups.py:337 uses for the backup-file password.
Path B (broken). ngu.random.* → external/libngu/ngu/random.c:73 CHIP_TRNG_32(), defined at line 24-26 as extern uint32_t rng_get(void).
It is unbelievable that some kid with an LLM just stole $100m+ because no one bothered to check the source code.
Also on GLM 5.2 (trained 16th June, no internet access).
2:16 PM · Aug 2, 2026 · 28.7K Views
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Second half of Chris (@ChrisGPT)'s tweet about the Coldcard Bitcoin wallet RNG vulnerability, including a quoted Reddit post from r/Bitcoin showing the specific code paths (ngu.random software PRNG vs hardware TRNG) that Claude Code identified as the critical flaw.
bitcoincybersecurityclaude codetwitterredditcryptocurrency
Chris ✔️ @ChrisGPT
Here's what actually happened with bitcoin and Claude because people are getting the story mixed up.
Coldcard hardware wallets were supposed to create each Bitcoin seed using real physical randomness from a chip.
But a firmware bug checked whether the hardware random number setting existed in the first place NOT whether it was actually enabled. It existed but was set to 0, so the wallet fell back to a randomized predictable software generator.
That reduced some wallets from roughly 2^128 possible seeds to around 2^40. The attacker could generate candidate seeds offline, derive their Bitcoin addresses and use the public blockchain like an answer key to see which wallets had funds.
Once one matched, they had a private key they could drain it without touching the device, and steal the seed phrase or "crack Bitcoin."
Researchers have now found 1,367 BTC, nearly $89 million, taken from 4,585 addresses.
The AI part happened AFTER all this. A Reddit user reportedly pointed Claude Code at the public firmware and asked only to "check for vulnerabilities." Within eight minutes, it traced the broken random number path and brought up the same hackable flaw. [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Tweet from Chris (@ChrisGPT) explaining the Coldcard hardware wallet firmware bug that weakened Bitcoin seed randomness (2^128 to 2^40), leading to $89M stolen, and clarifying that Claude Code was used afterward by a Reddit user to independently rediscover the vulnerability in 8 minutes.
bitcoincybersecurityclaude codetwittercryptocurrency
Andrew Curran @AndrewCurran_ · 7h
Update from r/Bitcoin. Claude Code can independently find the same wallet vulnerability used in this attack in eight minutes.
[embedded Reddit screenshot]
r/Bitcoin · 10h ago
Impressive-Gene-421
Are you kidding me? Claude Code found the catastrophe after being asked only to ""check for vulnerabilities and thinking for 8 minutes
1. ngu.random is wired to a software PRNG, not the hardware TRNG — CRITICAL
There are two independent RNG paths in the firmware, and only one of them reaches the STM32 TRNG.
Path A (correct). ckcc.rng_bytes() → stm32/COLDCARD_MK4/rng.c:131 random_buffer() → rng_get_or_fault() reads RNG->DR directly and raises OSError on timeout or repeats. This is what backups.py:337 uses for the backup-file password.
Path B (broken). ngu.random.* → external/libngu/ngu/random.c:73 CHIP_TRNG_32(), defined at line 24-26 as extern uint32_t rng_get(void).
It is unbelievable that some kid with an LLM just stole $100m+ because no one bothered to check the source code.
Also on GLM 5.2 (trained 16th June, no internet access).
[quoted tweet]
Andrew Curran @AndrewCurran_ · Aug 1
By the end of the year the tools available to anyone attempting this kind of attack will be vastly more capable across all devices. If there is a seam in any existing hardware, they will get their fingers in there. Attacks like this are about... [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
X post by Andrew Curran about a Reddit r/Bitcoin post claiming Claude Code independently found, in eight minutes, the firmware RNG vulnerability (Coldcard hardware wallet, software PRNG vs hardware TRNG path confusion) reportedly used in a large ($100m+) cryptocurrency theft. Includes technical code-path details from the Reddit post and Curran's follow-up warning about future attack tooling capability.
twittercryptocurrencyhardware walletvulnerabilityclaude codecoldcardcybersecurity
Tenobrus @tenobrus · 8h
its unfortunately looking like this may be beginning. one of the most "hardened" hardware bitcoin wallets was exploited, nearly $100 mil stolen from individual users. r/bitcoin in shambles.
attack surfaces are huge, and u don't need to break core protocols to steal coins
[quoted tweet]
Bitcoin Magazine @BitcoinM... · 21h
JUST IN: A third Coldcard hack has been reported with another 207.7294 BTC stolen.
A total of 1,367.05 BTC has been stolen from 4,585 addresses so far, according to Galaxy Research.
Users are urged to review the company's official security guidance as soon as possible‼️
[embedded Sankey-diagram chart: "Bitcoin Seed-Entropy Sweep: 4,585 Addresses Drained Across Three Waves", Source: Galaxy Research, Bitcoin network data. Columns: Victim Addresses (4,585 addresses) → Collectors and Parks (299 addresses) → Current Location, broken into Wave 1 (1,195 addresses), Wave 2 (1,478 addresses), Wave 3 (1,912 addresses), with flows in BTC amounts labeled at small scale (~594.48 BTC, 398.49 BTC, 88.85 BTC, 45.91 BTC, 30.18 BTC, 207.73 BTC etc.), footnote: 'Data as of Aug 1, 2026. Three waves...4,585 addresses, 1,367.05 BTC, ~$85.9M still held, 100% still unspent']
Galaxy Research
208 replies, 579 retweets, 1.9K likes, 363K views
[quoted tweet]
Tenobrus @tenobrus · Apr 7
epistemic status: loosely held speculation
this is probably a pretty bad time to be holding very much money in crypto wallets and especially smart contracts. ...
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Tweet thread discussing a major Coldcard hardware wallet exploit: a third hack reported with 207.7294 BTC stolen, bringing the total to 1,367.05 BTC (~$85.9M) stolen from 4,585 addresses across three waves per Galaxy Research, with an embedded Sankey diagram tracing fund flows from victim addresses to collector addresses. Includes an older (Apr 7) Tenobrus tweet speculating it's a bad time to hold crypto in wallets/smart contracts.
cryptocurrencycoldcard hackbitcoinsecuritytwitter
Charles Rosenbauer reposted
Danielle Fong 🐦☀️ @DanielleFong · 6h
The secret is that people have been relying on security via obscurity for so many years. Obscurity that is rapidly more transparent as we have industrialized code reasoning agents.
[quoted tweet]
Medusa @MedusaOnchain · 12h
this is insane
claude code found the COLDCARD wallet vulnerability with a single prompt, in just 8 minutes of thinking...
[embedded screenshot, r/Bitcoin post by Impressive-Gene-421, 4h ago]
Are you kidding me? Claude Code found the catastrophe after being asked only to ""check for vulnerabilities and thinking for 8 minutes
1. ngu.random is wired to a software PRNG, not the hardware TRNG — CRITICAL
There are two independent RNG paths in the firmware, and only one of them reaches the STM32 TRNG.
Path A (correct). ckcc.rng_bytes() → stm32/COLDCARD_MK4/rng.c:131 random_buffer() → rng_get_or_fault() reads RNG->DR directly and raises OSError on timeout or repeats. This is what backups.py:337 uses for the backup-file password.
Path B (broken). ngu.random.* → external/libngu/ngu/random.c:73 CHIP_TRNG_32(), defined at line 24-26 as extern uint32_t rng_get(void).
It is unbelievable that some kid with an LLM just stole $100m+ because no one bothered to check the source code.
Also on GLM 5.2 (trained 16th June, no internet access).
486 upvotes, 230 comments, share
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Chain of tweets/reposts about Claude Code allegedly finding a critical vulnerability in the COLDCARD hardware wallet's random number generator (a software PRNG path instead of hardware TRNG) after an 8-minute 'check for vulnerabilities' prompt, embedding an r/Bitcoin post with technical firmware code paths and a claim it enabled theft of $100m+; commentary from Danielle Fong on security-via-obscurity eroding as code-reasoning AI agents proliferate.
claude codesecurity vulnerabilitycoldcardcryptocurrencytwitterreddit
Andrew Curran @AndrewCurran_ · 4h
By the end of the year the tools available to anyone attempting this kind of attack will be vastly more capable across all devices. If there is a seam in any existing hardware, they will get their fingers in there. Attacks like this are about to start happening at scale.
[Quoted tweet]
Jonathan Good... @itscoachgoo... · 10h
$1.6 million dollars in Bitcoin was drained from my account on July 29th in the Cold Card wallet hack.
My Bitcoin was in cold storage. My keys were o... [cut off]
Note from Claude Sonnet 5
Tweet warning that hardware-wallet attack tools will become far more capable by year's end, quote-tweeting a report from Jonathan Good... that $1.6 million in Bitcoin was drained from a supposedly secure cold-storage Cold Card wallet on July 29th.
securitycryptocurrencyhackingtwitter
