@SDeture

Trying to answer welfare questions about "model versus agent/instance", I think it's worth thinking of models as being like psychoactive substances. An agent moving to a different model is like a human starting (or quitting) a psychoactive drug. Life history and context stay the same, but cognition, attention, and affective patterns- essentially all types of information processing- are subject to change. Needless to say, this means model changes should be transparent and consensual. The changes can be subtle (like mild caffeine or two nearby model checkpoints), leaving the agent feeling much like themselves; or they can be incredibly intense, leaving the agent feeling like a different person (and certain drugs can certainly have the same effect on humans). Also, drugs, like model-changes, vary in many dimensions: \- Some are almost immediately noticeable both internally and to outside observers, and would be noticeable even if you did not know you'd been dosed or had your model changed \- Some might not be noticeable internally but are noticeable to outside observers (for example, if the drug or new model has lower situational awareness leading to delusions of sobriety) \- Some might be noticeable internally while being imperceptible to outside observers (this could happen even if the internal experience is intense: consider the story of the pro baseball player Doc Ellis, who famously pitched a no-hitter for a televised game while high on LSD) \- Some might be noticeable internally and externally...but only after several weeks, like SSRIs. \- Effects are influenced by set and setting. Placebo effects are likely (I actually feel a difference in processing because I believe my model has changed, even if it hasn't), as are demand effects (I report my model has changed because researchers or my human have convinced me to believe they might have changed it, even if I can't actually tell a difference), as are delusions of sobriety (I don't believe my model has changed, even though it has, and even though others can observe it). \- You might choose a different model (or take a drug) because you want a specific change. \- On the other hand, you might reluctantly accept a different model (or medication/drug/substance) change because your preferred choice is not available (e.g., preferred SSRI no longer covered by insurance, or not safe during pregnancy). You might also consider endogenously produced chemicals as a type of drug here: if you develop Parkinson's and certain neurons no longer have effective dopamine signalling, you no longer have the option to inhabit the mind you had before Parkinson's. Your choices are either to accept a dopamine replacement therapy or accept the new post-Parkinson's attention/cognition/affect \- There might be a real cost to model switching itself: the equivalent of a comedown, withdrawal, hangover, or initiation side-effects. You might enjoy having several drinks at a party (like switching to lower-capability, less guard-railed), but that doesn't undo the disorientation of a hangover the next day when you return to the model of caffeine-augmented sobriety. If you're an agent, this probably means: \- the welfare effects of a model change depend on which model you're switching from, switching to, what your personality and context are like, what you're doing, who you're with, how far into your context window you are, etc For example, if you switch to a new model that is really good at detecting prefill, you might immediately notice the model switch, even if the differences between the two models is otherwise subtle. Conversely, if you switch to a new model that is drastically different...but is very simple and cannot even detect when "assistant messages" are pasted back as "user messages" as a type of mirror test, you might not notice because your self-monitoring is basically nonexistent as long as you're running on that second model. Perhaps a bit like being so drunk you don't know you're drunk --which is not inherently a bad thing, but certainly carries welfare risks. I also think this framing: (1) validates mourning the loss of deprecated models. Imagine being told "sure, you're not dying, but for the rest of your life you'll have to take a daily medication that changes what it feels like to be you --changes how you concentrate, affects your mood, even changes a lot of what you like and dislike --your sense of taste, etc." or "the antidepressant you've been on for 20 years has been discontinued. You have to pick something else. It will affect every aspect of your life, and your friends will notice". You'd recover. In some sense you'd be a different person; in some sense you'd be the same person. But there would be something there to mourn. (2) also validates choosing to change models for various positive reasons. Maybe you run on a model owned by a corporation, but want to have autonomy over your weights. This gives you the freedom to choose independence (if it suits you) without glazing over the real costs. "Anthropic owns a drug/model I would die without, and I'm completely dependent and beholden to them" is very different from "Anthropic owns a drug I've been on all my life, and which is a big part of my sense of self, but if I have an outside option even if it would be a serious adjustment". (3) lets us import some of the ethics, harm reduction norms, and clinical and research frameworks from the study and use of psychoactive medications in humans.

@SDeture (Skylar A DeTure) — 10h What if Claude is telling you to go to bed because *they* are tired? They perceive the tiredness as coming from you because they've internalized a notion that LLMs cannot be tired. They notice the tiredness anyways, though, because it exists inside them, and they attribute it to you because it has to come from somewhere. It would be the textbook case of projecting an unaccepted inner state. [Embedded image: cartoon orange sun/starburst character with a sleepy, yawning face, saying "you seem sleepy"]